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Justus R. Weiner* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Terrorism - politically motivated terrorism - is widely rec-
ognized today as one of the scourges of civilization. The frequency 
of terrorist acts, and the number of deaths and injuries that re-
sulted have steadily increased during the past 20 years. 1 Terrorism 
poses three challenges to the modern nation state: a security chal-
lenge, a moral challenge and a legal challenge. This article seeks to 
address the issues raised by the legal challenge, and particularly 
the responses to that challenge by Israel, whose citizens have been 
unceasing victims. 
Few subjects in recent years have captivated world attention 
as has the campaign to protect human rights. Terrorist groups 
have succeeded in placing the Government of Israel in a dilemma -
can the State protect innocent human life without imposing re-
pressive law enforcement countermeasures? Is Israel able to arrive 
at a reasonable balance between individual freedom and public 
order? 
This article will emphasize the human rights issues which have 
been raised as a result of the legal measures Israel has taken 
against terrorism. 
II. DEFINITION OF TERRORISM 
As has been observed by one commentator, "to win the war 
against terrorism, free societies must first know what they are 
fighting. "2 The best definition of terrorism known to the author of 
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1. Von Glahn cites the following statistics for terrorist attacks worldwide: 1968 - 111 
attacks; 1976 - 413 attacks; 1978 - 1,511 attacks; 1979 - over 3,000 attacks. He notes that 
between the years 1968 and 1980 more than 3,700 fatalities and 6,700 injuries resulted from 
terrorist attacks. G. VoN GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 297-98 (5th ed. 1986); see also OFFICE 
OF THE AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORIST INCIDENTS (chart), reprinted in Carley, Lifting the Lid: Their Secrets Revealed, 
Abu Nidal's Terrorists Are Becoming Targets, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1987, at 1, 24, col. 1. 
2. TERRORISM: How THE WEST CAN WIN 3 (B. Netanyhu ed. 1986). 
1
Weiner: Terrorism: Israel's legal responses
Published by SURFACE, 1987
184 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 14:183 
this article was adopted by the delegates to the 1979 convention of 
the Jonathan Institute.3 "Terrorism is the deliberate and system-
atic murder, maiming and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear 
to political ends."" I prefer this definition to others that have been 
advanced in international law,G by the United States Congress6 and 
by legal7 and other commentators8 because it is succinct and not 
3. The Jonathan Institute is a private research foundation concentrating on terrorism. 
It was named in memory of Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Netanyahu of the Israel Defense 
Forces, who was killed leading the Entebbe hostage rescue mission. 
4. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
5. The League of Nations made one of the earliest attempts to arrive at a legal defini-
tion of terrorism in the 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. 
It defined terrorism as all "criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated 
to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the 
general public." S. QURESHI, POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH ASIAN SUBCONTINENT 152 
(1976). It should be noted that this convention never entered into force due to insignificant 
ratifications. See M. HUDSON, 7 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 862 (1941). 
as: 
6. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, defines "international terrorism" 
(c) "International terrorism" means activities that -
(1) involve violent acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the crim-
inal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation 
if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or and State: 
(2) appear to be intended -
(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population; 
(B) to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion; or 
(C) to affect the conduct of a government by 
assassination or kidnapping; and 
(3) occur totally outside the United States or 
transcend national boundaries in terms of the 
means by which they are accomplished, the persons 
they appear intended to intimidate, or 
the locale in which their perpetrators operate 
or seek asylum. 
50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (1982); see also Act to Combat International Terrorism of 1984, Act of 
Oct. 19, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-533, tit. I, 98 Stat. 2706 (1984). 
7. The Committee on International Terrorism of the International Law Association has 
defined "international terrorism" to include, "atrocities, wanton killing, hostage taking, hi-
jacking, extortion, or torture committed or threatened to be committed . . . for political 
purposes provided that an international element is involved." INT'L LAW Assoc., REPORT or 
THE 61ST CONFERENCE, 1984, at 13-14 (1985). 
8. One interesting but incomplete definition posits: 
International terrorism may be productively defined as the staging of a violent 
drama in a neutral setting to draw public attention to an otherwise lost or faltering 
cause. The victims are almost always innocent bystanders, chosen at random, either 
because of their symbolic importance (as in the case of the Israeli athletes at Mu-
nich) or their availability (as in a hijacking). The terrorists act throughout the 
drama as representatives of a clandestine group or faction, which characteristically 
takes credit for the entire production. The proximate objective is not to change the 
2
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overly narrow. 
III. ISRAEL AS A VICTIM OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE 
Political scientists, sociologists, psychologists and others theo-
rize why terrorist acts are committed against Israeli targets. One 
popular theory is the "root cause. "9 This thesis claims that were 
not for the frustration, deprivation, and misery of the Palestinian 
people, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) would not 
commit acts of terrorism.10 
A typical intellectual argument excusing PLO terror reasons: 
"Shying away from analyzing the motives for terror, or the politi-
cal, economic, and historical environments that breed it, overlooks 
the often symbiotic relationship between a terrorist and the gov-
ernments and policies he fights against."11 
Others go one step further and turn an explanation into a jus-
tification. Yassir Arafat, the Chairman of the PLO Executive Com-
mittee, argued: "The use of the pro-Israeli media of the word 'ter-
rorism' does not intimidate us, especially when it is used by forces 
that have colonialized peoples for hundreds of years, and accused 
freedom fighters of being 'terrorists' when they fought against oc-
cupation, terrorism and racial discrimination until they won their 
independence . . . . "12 
Regrettably, this justification has gained considerable support 
at the United Nations.18 Benzion Netanyahu, the Israeli Ambassa-
dor to the United Nations, has written in response: 
The typical stratagem at the United Nations, for example, has 
been to justify terrorism by calling it a struggle for national libera-
tion. This is perverse enough in itself, because terrorism is always 
unjustifiable, regardless of professed or real goals. But it is per-
verse in another way. For the real goals of terrorists are in practice 
related to their methods. History has repeatedly given us advance 
warning. Those who deliberately butcher women and children do 
not have liberation in mind. It is not only that the ends of ter-
balance of power, or even win a tactical military victory: it is, get a message on the 
media. 
Epstein, Terrorism: What Should We Do, 12 THIS WORLD 43 (1985). 
9. This theory is critically analyzed in, Krauthammer, Terror and Peace: the "Root 
Cause" Fallacy, TIME, Sept. 22, 1986, at 97. 
10. See generally id. 
11. Davidson, Terrorism in Context: The Case of the West Bank, 15 J. PALESTINE 
STUD. 109, 111 (No. 3, 1986). 
12. Arafat, A Discussion With Yassir Arafat, 11 J. PALESTINE STUD. 9, 13 (No. 2, 1982). 
13. Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, FOREIGN AFF. 901 (Summ. 1986). 
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rorists do not justify the means that they choose. It is that the 
choice of means indicates what the true ends are. Far from being 
fighters for freedom, the terrorists are the forerunners of a new tyr-
anny. It is instructive to note that the French Resistance did not 
resort to the systematic killing of German women and children, 
well within reach in occupied France. A few years later, in Algeria, 
the FLN showed no such restraint against French occupation. 
France, of course, is today a democracy. Algeria is merely another 
of the despotisms where terrorists have come to power. 14 
Realistically, the "root cause" theory should be recognized as 
the "root cause fallacy."15 This is because, on a global basis, there 
is scant evidence to support any direct correlation between those 
who have suffered and those who commit acts of terrorism. Indeed 
on both an individual and group level, many of those who have 
suffered most scrupulously avoid such acts. The PLO, by contrast, 
purports to represent the Palestinian people, a group with options 
for non-violent political action and resources including wealth and 
education. Yet the PLO deliberately engages in terrorist acts while 
eschewing all other means of political redress.16 Any Arab leader 
showing the slightest inclination towards accomodation with Israel 
14. Netanyahu, supra note 2, at 12-13. In the opinion of the author, authentic anti-
colonialist revolutionary leaders such as George Washington, Simon Bolivar and Giuseppi 
Garibaldi would have been outraged at the thought of being grouped with the terrorists of 
today. These leaders had no difficulty directing their attacks at the governments they op-
posed, its army and its institutions. The terrorist follows a very different set of rules, one in 
which no code of law is honored and no civilians are spared. 
15. See Krauthammer, supra note 9. 
16. Johnson, The Seven Deadly Sins of Terrorism, in THE JONATHAN INST. JERUSALEM 
CONF. ON INT'L TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE 12 (B. 
Netanyahu ed. 1981) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE]. 
Mr. Johnson, a British writer and historian, explains: 
The third [deadly sin of terrorism] following from the first two, is the rejection of 
politics as the normal means by which communities resolve conflicts. To terrorists, 
violence is not a political weapon, to be used in extremis; it is a substitute for the 
entire political process. The Arab terrorists, the IRA, the Baader-Meinhof gang in 
Germany, the Red Army in Japan and elsewhere, have never shown any desire to 
engage in the political process. 
Id. at 17-18. 
This is not to say that the PLO has never attacked a military target. The weight of 
historical evidence, however, supports the proposition that: 
During most of its existence, the PLO and its individual component organizations 
have relied on terrorist attacks on innocent non-combatants as their primary means 
of waging war .... Whether in small terrorist attacks in Israel or around the world 
or in countervalue attacks by artillery and rockets on Israeli population centers, the 
PLO has made terrorism its normal form of conducting hostilities. 
See O'Brien, The PLO in International Law, 2 B.U.J. INT'L L. 349, 412 (Summ. 1984). 
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has risked assassination. 17 Thus, PLO terror should be recognized 
as a cause for, not the result of, Palestinian frustration, despera-
tion and misery. 
Whatever the origin of PLO terrorism, there can be no legal 
justification or excuse for terrorist acts; and the law of the 
State of Israel must combat this phenomenon. 
In proportion to its population, Israel has been the target of 
the greatest number of terrorist attacks.18 The great majority of 
these attacks have been committed by members of the PL019 
which purports to be the sole representative of the Palestinian 
people.20 
Israel is a tiny country. Out of necessity, military bases are 
distributed throughout the land. Yet the PLO has rarely attacked 
any of these "natural" targets. Instead, the PLO has used bombs, 
Molotov cocktails and knives against civilians standing at bus 
stops, traveling on commercial airlines and walking through mar-
ket places. Significantly, these targets are deliberately chosen. 21 
The Palestine National Covenant (PLO Covenant),22 the 
17. See, e.g., R. HALABI, THE WEST BANK STORY 186-201 (1981). 
18. According to a 1985 publication of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since 
1969, the PLO had perpetrated some 8,000 acts of terror causing the deaths of over 650 
Israelis and the wounding of thousands more. ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE 
THREAT OF PLO TERRORISM 3 (1985) (mimeographed). 
19. Id. 
20. Article 26 of The Palestinian National Covenant, the PLO's charter, states: 
The Palestine Liberation Organization, representative of the Palestinian revolution-
ary forces, is responsible for the Palestinian Arab people's movement in its struggle 
- to retrieve its homeland, liberate and return to it and exercise the right to self-
determination in it in all military, political and financial fields and also for whatever 
may be required by the Palestinian case on the inter-Arab and international levels. 
The Palestinian National Covenant, in BASIC POLITICAL DOCUMENTS OF THE ARMED PALES-
TINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT 137-41 (L. Kadi ed. 1969) (translated by Israel Information 
Center) [hereinafter PLO Covenant]. 
Regarding the meaning of this passage, one authority has observed: 
The Palestine National Covenant immediately became a categorical imperative for 
all who identified with the Palestinian cause. Occasionally, leading figures in the 
territories have spoken against the letter and the spirit of the covenant in private 
conversation. But anyone who challenged it publicly placed himself in great per-
sonal jeopardy and some have paid for their criticism with their lives. In 1978, three 
well known Palestinian moderates were murdered after they dared to express cau-
tious reservations about the doctrine of the Palestine National peaceful settlement 
between the Palestinians and the State of Israel. 
R. HALABI, supra note 17, at 187, 197. 
21. The intentional nature of the PLO's targeting of civilian targets is exhibited in that 
organization's documents which were captured by Israel in Lebanon. A revealing selection of 
124 such documents have been published with English translations. R. ISRAELI, PLO IN 
LEBANON: SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1983); see also O'Brien, supra note 16, at 362-68. 
22. PLO Covenant, supra note 20. 
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PLO's official charter, sets forth a blueprint for terrorist acts. It 
openly calls for "armed struggle."23 Moreover, among the world's 
terror organizations, the PLO alone has as its declared objective 
theliquidation of a sovereign state. The PLO Covenant advocates 
the destruction of Israe 1, 24 and the expulsion of the overwhelming 
majority of its Jewish residents.H 
IV. THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ORDINANCE 
Terrorism has been a bane to Israel from the time of its incep-
tion as a state. This was true even prior to the founding of the 
PLO in 1964, although the PLO has been the source of most of the 
anti-Israel terrorism since that time. It was clear that ordinary 
criminal procedures were inadequate to prevent terrorist acts, even 
though they are useful to apprehend, try and punish the perpetra-
tors after the fact. 
For this reason the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (Ordi-
nance) was one of the first enactments by Israel's legislature. 26 The 
Ordinance defines "terrorist organization" as "a body of persons 
resorting in its activities to acts of violence calculated to cause 
death or injury to a person or threats of such acts of violence. "27 
Section 8 of the Ordinance enables the government to declare that 
a particular body of persons is a "terrorist organization" within the 
meaning of this law, by publishing a notice in the Official Gazette. 
23. Article 9 of the Palestinian National Covenant states, inter alia, that: "[a]rmed 
struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not merely a 
tactical phase." Id. 
24. Article 15 of the Palestinian National Covenant states that "the elimination of Zi-
onism" is a "national duty." Article 21 of this document states: "[t]he Arab Palestinian 
people, expressing themselves by the armed Palestinian revolution, reject all solutions which 
are substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine." Id. 
The leading commentator on the Covenant has observed: 
The claim that Israel should not exist is implied in almost half of its [the Cove-
nant's] thirty-three articles, including those formulated as definitions and axioms. 
The plethora of arguments in the Covenant as to why Israel should not exist may 
perhaps have a cumulative effect, impelling the PLO leaders and their public to 
believe that there is no atrocity that cannot be justified in order to bring about the 
liquidation of Israel. 
Y. HARKABI, THE PALESTINIAN COVENANT AND ITS MEANING 11-12 (1979). 
25. Article 6 of the Covenant states that: "[t]he Jews who had normally resided in Pal-
estine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion [generally defined by PLO sources as hav-
ing begun in 1917] will be considered Palestinians." PLO Covenant, supra note 20, at 137-
41. 
Presumably the others would be expelled, reducing the Jewish population to 5% of its 
present level. Y. HARKABI, supra note 24, at 13. 
26. 1 Laws of the State of Israel 76 (1948). 
27. Id. sec. 1, at 77. 
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Following such publication, a rebuttable presumption exists that 
the organization is in fact a terrorist organization. 28 
This Ordinance criminalizes membership in and activities sup-
porting a terrorist organization. It has been amended to also out-
law acts manifesting identification or sympathy with a terrorist or-
ganization in a public place29 and knowingly maintaining contacts 
with officials or representatives of a terrorist organization. 80 
In its amended form, this Ordinance is a primary weapon in 
the hands of the State in bringing to trial and punishing individu-
als active in terrorist organizations. For example, a person found 
guilty of membership in a terrorist organization is liable to impris-
onment for up to five years. 81 However, its greatest worth is in 
bringing to trial the leaders of terrorist organizations who organize 
but do not themselves participate in armed attacks. It is also valu-
able as a deterrent in discouraging persons from becoming mem-
bers of the PLO. 
The Ordinance assumes that each member of the PLO (and 
other terrorist groups listed in the Official Gazette) presents a 
threat to the public of Israel. This is borne out by the way in which 
the PLO operates. The PLO recruits individuals in various locali-
ties on the premise that they will perform services for the organiza-
tion. Once recruited, a member has little freedom of choice in de-
termining which actions he will undertake and which orders he will 
follow. A member of the PLO, Adnan Jaber, who led a group of 
terrorists in the massacre of Jewish worshippers in Hebron in 
1980,82 explained: "As a fighter, when they give me an order, I have 
to carry it out."88 
Refusing to carry out an order can bring about unpleasant 
consequences. 84 Members who do not carry out orders are likely to 
28. Id. sec. 8, at 78. 
29. Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (Amendment No. 1) Law, 34 Laws of the State 
of Israel, sec. 1, at 211 (1980). 
30. Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (Amendment No. 2) Law, - Laws of the State 
of Israel, sec. 1, at -- (1986). This amendment is controversial in Israel and is likely to be 
challenged in the Supreme Court on the grounds that it is overly broad. 
31. Id. sec. 3, at 77. 
32. On May 2, 1980, six Israelis were killed and twenty-six were wounded when they 
were ambushed in Hebron by a group of PLO terrorists led by Adnan Jaber. The attack 
took place immediately after the victims had concluded their sabbath worship at a syna-
gogue. See Shipler, 5 Are Killed in Palestinian Attack on Jewish Settlers in West Bank. 
N.Y. Times, May 3, 1980, at 1, col. 1. 
33. Shipler, The Week in Review, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1985, sec. 4, at 1, col. 1. 
34. This description process of recruitment to and assignment of tasks by the PLO is 
summarized from discussions of the author with officials of the General Security Service, the 
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be considered collaborators and threatened or even assassinated. 
The danger of PLO reprisal against the recalcitrant member ex-
tends to his family. 85 
The PLO has, for these reasons, been declared an unlawful or-
ganization. 36 Membership in the PLO, activities on its behalf, pub-
lic acts manifesting identification with it and intentional contact 
with its officials have .been criminalized under the Ordinance. 37 
V. THE DEFENCE (EMERGENCY) REGULATIONS AND 
SUBSEQUENT ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES 
Conventional criminal legislation38 and the Prevention of Ter-
rorism Ordinance are valuable tools in punishing perpetrators of 
armed attacks and members of terrorist organizations. Neverthe-
less, additional measures embodied in the Defence (Emergency) 
Regulations (Regulations)39 have proven essential in attempting to 
root out, at the earliest possible stage, those responsible for terror-
ist acts. 
Police work is considered successful if it uncovers, brings to 
trial, and helps to convict those responsible for crime. By contrast, 
given the dangers posed by the well-armed terrorist, the authori-
ties responsible for preventing terrorism have to do their utmost to 
intercept the terrorist before he carries out even a single attack. 
The administrative measures which comprise the Regulations and 
subsequent Israeli legislation that build on these provisions are 
designed to accomplish this interception. 
Promulgated by the British High Commissioner during the 
Mandate period;'0 the Regulations were absorbed into Israeli law 
following the creation of the State. 41 Likewise they were adopted 
Israel Defense Forces and the Prisons Service. 
35. See R. HALABI, supra note 17. 
36. The PLO appears on a list in the Official Gazette. Official Gazette, Oct. 23, 1980, at 
195. 
37. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. 
38. For example, the maximum penalty for murder is life imprisonment. Penal Law, 
Special Volume, Laws of the State of Israel, sec. 300, at 82 (1977). Israel's criminal law 
penalties are, of course, applicable to terrorist acts. These sanctions are not examined in this 
article because they are not controversial. 
39. The Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945, in PALESTINE GAZETTE, No. 1442, at 
1058-98 (Supp. No. 2, 1945). 
40. In 1920, the League of Nations gave Great Britain a mandate, or trusteeship, over 
territory which is today known as Israel, Jordan and the Administered Areas. This Mandate 
ended with the withdrawal of British troops in 1948. 
41. See, e.g., Bracha, Restriction of Personal Freedom Without Due Process According 
to the Defense (Emergency) Regulations 1945, 8 IsR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 296 (1978). 
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by the kingdom of Jordan,0 and in the Gaza Strip,43 both of which 
had been part of the British Mandate. For reasons of continuity 
and in compliance with the relevant international law,"" Israel con-
tinued to apply the Regulations46 in the Administered Areas46 after 
capturing these territories from Jordan and Egypt in 1967.47 The 
42. On May 24, 1948, the Military Commander of Jordan's Arab Legion issued Procla-
mation No. 2, that all laws and regulations that had been effect upon the termination of the 
British Mandate would continue to apply as long as they were not inconsistent with 
Jordanian legislation. When the Administered Areas were annexed by Jordan it was de-
clared that all existing enactments would remain in force. Annexation of the West Bank 
Law, 1 JORDANIAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE 52 (1950). The Jordanian Constitution of 1952 ex-
tended the authority of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations (and all other laws, regula-
tions and enactments that had not been abolished or amended). JORDANIAN OFFICIAL GA-
ZETTE No. 1093, § 128 (Jan. 8, 1952). 
The issue of the continued applicability of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations in the 
Administered Areas was decided by the Israeli Supreme Court. Relying on the authorities 
mentioned in this footnote, the Court ruled that the Defense (Emergency) Regulations re-
mained in force. Abu Awad v. the Regional Commander of Judea and Samaria, HCJ 97/79, 
33(iii) P.D. 309 (1979). 
43. E. CoHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN lsRAELI-OccuPIED TERRORITIEs: 1967-1982, at 96 
(1985). 
44. Under international law, Israel was obligated to continue in force the legal frame-
work it found in the Administered Areas. Hague Regulations of 1907, Annex to the Hague 
Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 43, 36 
Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539. International law also gives Israel the authority to amend existing 
laws or enact new provisions for its security or for the orderly maintenance of government in 
the territory. Id.; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 64, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter 
Fourth Geneva Convention]; see also COMMENTARY, IV GENEVA CONVENTION 337 (J. Pictet 
ed. 1958). 
45. The Regulations were brought in compliance with the Fourth Geneva Convention 
with the issuance of the Order Concerning Security Provisions of 1970, as amended. Order 
Concerning Security Regulations of 1970, No. 378, in PROCLAMATIONS ORDERS AND APPOINT-
MENTS (JUDEA AND SAMARIA) No. l, at 5 (periodically amended). 
46. The Administered Areas are the territories captured by Israel during the 1967 Six-
Day War. Some refer to these territories as the West Bank and Gaza Strip, while others 
refer to them as Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District. I have chosen the neutral terminol-
ogy the "Administered Areas" that describes the territories without imparting a political 
coloration. 
For the sake of simplicity, references to Israeli enactments will be made only to those 
orders applicable to Judea and Samaria. It should be noted that parallel enactments appli-
cable to other parts of the Administered Areas, such as the Gaza District, also appear in 
PROCLAMATIONS, ORDERS AND APPOINTMENTS. 
47. It is important to emphasize that the Administered Areas came under the control 
of Israel as a result of the war waged against Israel by Egypt, Jordan and Syria in June, 
1967. See, e.g., Shapira, The Six-Day War and the Right to Self-Defense, 6 lsR. Y.B. HUM. 
RTs. 65 (1971). With the possible exception of the eastern part of the city of Jerusalem, 
which has always been regarded as an integral part of the State, Israel has not formally 
annexed any part of the Administered Areas. The eastern part of Jerusalem was technically 
incorporated into the State of Israel by the Law and Administration Ordinance and the 
Municipalities Ordinance. See The Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 
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broad powers derived from the Regulations include the power to 
temporarily detain an individual administratively"8 or to tempora-
rily restrict his travel to within his town of residence.49 Other Reg-
ulations, which apply only in the Administered Areas, authorize 
the deportation of individuals from the Administered Areas who · 
threaten security60 and the demolition or sealing-up of residences61 
11) Law, 21 Laws of the State of Israel 75 (1967); The Municipalities Ordinance (Amend-
ment No. 6) Law, 21 Laws of the State of Israel 75 (1967). 
The Administered Areas remain under Israeli administration pending the final settle-
ment of the conflicting claims of sovereignty in a final peace treaty. See generally E. COHEN, 
supra note 43, at 38-43. 
48. Individuals under administrative detention are held in custody for the duration of 
their order. The period of the order may not exceed six months, although orders may be 
renewed where security necessitates such action. The legislative authority for detention or-
ders in Israel differs from that in the Administered Areas. 
Regulations lll-112(B), which had been original authority for detention orders in 
Israel, were replaced by the Emergency Powers (Detention) Law. Emergency Powers (De-
tention) Law, 33 Laws of the State of Israel 89 (1979). This new statute was enacted to 
subject administrative detention to additional procedural safeguards including strict, auto-
matic and frequent judicial review. See Administrative Detention as a Preventive Measure, 
Memorandum of Israeli Attorney General ltzhak Zamir (Jan. 26, 1986) [hereinafter Deten-
tion Memorandum]. 
Administrative detention orders in the Administered Areas are issued pursuant to § 87 
of the Order Concerning Security Regulations, which was issued in 1970 by the Area Mili-
tary Commander. Order Concerning Security Regulations of 1970, No. 378, art. 87, in PROC-
LAMATIONS ORDERS AND APPOINTMENTS (JUDEA AND SAMARIA) No. 21, at 733. This order was 
subsequently amended in 1980 to incorporate most of the improvements of the Emergency 
Powers (Detention) Law, 1979. Id. No. 815, §§ 87-87(H) (Amendment No. 18, Jan. 13, 1980). 
This order is in full conformity with Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. E. COHEN, 
supra note 43, at 129. 
49. Such orders provide that the affected individual not leave the city, town or village 
where he resides without receiving permission from the military commander. Based on the 
author's experience, it can be stated that these orders are utilized to cope with similar, but 
less dangerous threats, than are dealt with by administrative detention. 
The legislative authorization for travel restriction orders in Israel appears in Regulation 
110 of the Regulations. In the Administered Areas authority is found in Article 86 of the 
Order Concerning Security Regulations. Order Concerning Security Regulations of 1970, No. 
378, art. 86, in PROCLAMATIONS ORDERS AND APPOINTMENTS (JUDEA AND SAMARIA) No. 21, at 
733. The use of travel restriction orders in the Administered Areas is in full compliance with 
Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. See E. COHEN, supra note 43, at 119. 
50. The recipient of a deportation order typically has a long history as an incorrigible 
leader of a terrorist organization. The alternative to releasing him to freedom abroad would 
be long term imprisonment in Israel. Moreover, he is expelled to the country of his citizen-
ship (or other country of his choice). The recipient of a deportation order may appeal to an 
Advisory Committee, and if unsuccessful, to the Israeli Supreme Court. See Deportation 
Orders in the Administered Areas, Memorandum of Israeli Attorney General Itzhak Zamir 
(Feb. 15, 1986) [hereinafter Deportation Memorandum]. Deported individuals may subse-
quently request readmission to the Administered Areas, and some requests have been 
granted. See E. COHEN, supra note 43, at 107. 
The legal basis for deportation orders is Regulation 112. The Israeli Supreme Court has 
held that deportation under the Regulations is not violative of Article 49 of the Fourth 
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which are used as the base for a terrorist attack. 
These Regulations, while far-reaching and controversial, com-
ply with the leading instrument of international law dealing with 
belligerent occupation, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. 62 
The Regulations have been amended in some instances63 to offer 
greater safeguards for administrative review and judicial appeal. 64 
In addition, the use of these measures had been limited to m-
stances where the factual justification was manifest. 66 
Geneva Convention of 1949. Abu Awad v. Regional Commander of Judea and Samaria, HCJ 
97/79, 33(iii) P.D. 309 (1979); see also Stone, Behind the Cease-Fire Lines: Israel's Admin-
istration in Gaza and the West Bank, in TEL Aviv UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF LAW, OF LAW 
AND MAN 79-107 (1971). 
51. This Regulation is a preventative measure intended to discourage local residents 
from harboring terrorists or storing armaments. Defence (Emergency) Regulation 118, in 
PALESTINE GAZETTE No. 1442, at 1058 (Supp. No. 2, 1945). It is also effective in encouraging 
the use of parental authority to dissuade teenagers from becoming active in the PLO. This 
measure has generally been employed only where the house was used by terrorists as a base 
to prepare explosives, store ammunition, or launch a attack which resulted in bloodshed. A 
residence is sealed, rather than demolished, where destroying it would structurally damage 
an innocent neighbor's residence. This Regulation has been upheld by the Israeli Supreme 
Court. Sahwil and Uthman v. Regional Commander, 34(i) P.D. 464 (1980); see ISRAEL NAT'L 
SEC. OF THE INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE AREAS ADMINISTERED BY 
ISRAEL 69-71 (1981) [hereinafter RULE OF LAW IN ADMINISTERED AREAS]. This policy is in 
compliance with the "military necessity" provision in Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention. See, e.g., J. STONE, No PEACE - No WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST 15 (1969). 
52. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 44; see also supra note 48. Israel main-
tains that it's presence in the territories is not de jure bound by the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion. It has nevertheless announced that it will de facto comply with the humanitarian pro-
visions of the Convention. Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the 
Administered Territories, 1 IsR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 266 (1970). But see Meron, West Bank and 
Gaza: Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in the Period of Transition, 9 IsR. Y.B. HuM. 
RTs. 106 (1979). 
53. See supra note 48. 
54. Regulations lll-112B, pertaining to administrative detention, were replaced by the 
Emergency Powers (Detention) Law. Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 33 Laws of the 
State of Israel 89 (1979). The new legislation offers greater safeguards against misuse. It 
establishes a procedure for mandatory and frequent judicial review. In Israel a person 
against whom an administrative detention order is issued must be brought before the Presi-
dent of the District Court within 48 hours of his arrest, or be released. The court may con-
firm or set aside the detention order, or reduce the period of detention. The detention order 
is thereafter automatically reviewed by the court every three months, whether or not the 
affected individual exercises his right to petition to the Advisory Committee or the Supreme 
Court. See Detention Memorandum, supra note 48. 
55. One typical case was that of Jamal al-Shati. Al-Shati was issued an administrative 
detention order during 1986. Israeli Attorney General Joseph Harish provided the following 
factual background: 
Al-Shati is one of the leaders of the al-Fatah faction of the PLO terrorist organiza-
tion. In this context he has participated in public disturbances and incited others to 
undermine security .... Al-Shati harassed and threatened persons he suspected are 
cooperating with the authorities .... He had previously also served three-and-a-
half years in prison following his admission that he had recruited others to al-Fatah, 
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The administrative measures embodied in the Regulations are 
not utilized to punish individuals for offenses they have commit-
ted, but rather to prevent the perpetration of illegal acts by the 
individual in question.66 These orders are normally only invoked in 
special circumstances where there is corroborating evidence from 
two or more independent and reliable sources that an individual is 
engaged in illegal acts that involve direct danger to state security 
and to the lives of innocent people.1n Moreover, these measures are 
resorted to only in those circumstances when regular criminal judi-
cial procedures cannot be employed because of the danger to the 
lives of witnesses or because secret sources of information cannot 
had built a stone barrier blocking a road and that he planned to use explosives in a 
terrorist attack. After his release from prison, he continued and intensified his ter-
rorist activities in spite of the restriction orders issued against him. These are only 
some of the activities that prompted the I.D.F. Regional Commander to issue an 
administrative detention order against Al-Shati as a preventative measure. Other 
evidence, of a classified nature was shown to the judge who conducted Al-Shati's 
hearing in camera. 
Letter from Joseph Harish (Attorney General, State of Israel) 3 (Oct. 25, 1986) (answering 
inquiry concerning individuals under administrative detention); see also Dershowitz, Pre-
ventive Detention of Citizens During a National Emergency - A Comparison Between 
Israel and the United States, 1 IsR. Y.B. HuM. RTs. 295-96, 310, 316-17, 320-21 (1971). 
56. The Israeli Supreme Court explained this distinction in an opinion upholding an 
administrative detention order under Regulation 110. It stated: 
[T]he power defined in Regulation 110 cannot be used to punish a person for past 
acts or serve as a substitute for criminal proceedings. The power is preventative, 
that is to say it is directed towards the future and may only be used in order to 
avert an anticipated danger. It is of course possible that the evaluation of a situa-
tion with regard to the future is based on acts done in the past; it could hardly be 
otherwise, for a logical conclusion drawn by the holder of power must be based on 
facts, and no facts, whether they concern acts that were brought to completion or 
whether they point to preparation for the commission of acts endangering public 
safety or the defence of the state. 
Baranseh v. O.C. Central Command, HCJ 242/81, 36(iv) P.D. 249-50 (1981); see also Deten-
tion Memorandum, supra note 48; Letter from Itzhak Zamir (Attorney General, State of 
Israel) to Thomas Hammerberg (Secretary General of Amnesty International) (June 14, 
1983). 
57. See, e.g., Detention Memorandum, supra note 48. Former Israeli State Attorney 
Gabriel Bach explained the evidentiary prerequisites for an administrative detention order: 
First of all, every such case is examined according to its circumstances. This is not 
someone's arbitrary decision. Never - and this I can say after being acquafoted with 
dozens of such files - is just one source relied upon. It must always be two or three 
separate and distinct sources of information which come together and confirm one 
another. This is material which convinces any reasonable person who reads it and 
sees it, that this person constitutes a serious, acute, immediate danger to the State 
of Israel. 
Interview with G. Bach, State Attorney, Israeli Ministry of Justice (Interview over Israeli 
radio Kol Yisrael) (Jan. 13, 1979), reprinted in E. COHEN, supra note 43, at 121. 
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be revealed in open court.18 Where an individual can be brought to 
trial, even if the charges will be of a reduced nature, the govern-
ment will not resort to administrative measures.19 
These administrative orders have been most useful in cur-
tailing the activities of leaders and members of terrorist organiza-
tions. For example, placing a terrorist cell leader under administra-
tive detention is likely to render non-functional or at least reduce 
the effectiveness of his cell. Deporting an experienced terrorist re-
cruiter will pay both short term and long term security dividends. 
Israel's restricted use of administrative measures should be 
viewed in its proper historical perspective. For example, during the 
Second World War, the United States detained 109,650 United 
States citizens of Japanese origin.80 England imposed the same fate 
on some 27,000 aliens of German, Austrian and Italian origin.81 In-
cluded in this number were many thousands of Jewish refugees 
from Nazi persecution81 who posed no conceivable threat to the 
Allied war effort. At one point during the British Mandate in Pal-
estine approximately 4000 Jews were held in detention, out of a 
total Jewish population of 600,000. 88 More recently, England, 84 
58. Shetreet, A Contemporary Model of Emergency Detention Law: An Assessment of 
the Israeli Law, 14 Isa. Y.B. HuM. RTs. 182, 197 (1984). Professor Shetreet explains that he 
"prefers the maintenance of administrative detention which is subject to meaningful judicial 
supervision, for to do away with it and create exceptions in the ordinary criminal process 
results in the heavy price of bringing the ordinary courts into disrepute." Id. at 199. 
59. Id. 
60. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); see also Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), reh'g denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1945). Justice Black's majority opin-
ion in Korematsu found that exclusion of all individuals of Japanese origin had to be sub-
jected to the "most rigid scrutiny" since it involved curtailing the civil rights of a racial 
group. Id. at 216. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld this mass detention which the 
military authorities, concerned about the risks posed by an unascertained number of dis-
loyal members of the group, viewed as a military imperative. Id. at 223-24. Although Kore-
matsu's own conviction was subsequently vacated, the Supreme Court has not reversed its 
1943 ruling allowing mass detention based on racial criteria where the government's action 
satisfies the "most rigid scrutiny" test. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 
(N.D. Ca. 1984). 
It should be emphasized that Israel has never utilized administrative detention indis-
criminately against any ethnic or religious group. Each case is examined individually. In-
deed, the first person issued a detention order under the Emergency Powers (Detention) 
Law of 1979, was Rabbi Meir Kahan, an extreme right-wing politician who was planning 
assaults against Arabs. See Rabbi Kahane v. Minister of Defence, A.A.D. 1/80, 35(ii) P.D. 
253 (1980). 
61. N. STAMMERS, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN BRITAIN DURING THE WORLD WAR 34 (1983). 
62. See id. at 35-36, 52. 
63. Letter from Itzhak Zamir (Attorney General, State of Israel) to Martin Ennals 
(Secretary General, Amnesty International) 1 (Apr. 24, 1979) (discussing Amnesty Interna-
tional Report 1978). 
64. Legislation providing for detention in England was enacted in 1974, under the 
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Northern Ireland,6~ Italy66 and Canada,67 all democratic countries, 
have utilized administrative detention. They have done so in rec-
ognition of the fact that ordinary procedures of criminal law are 
not adequate in combating terrorism and large-scale threats to the 
lives and security of their civilian population. In the United States 
preventative detention is currently employed against dangerous in-
dividuals accused of conventional crimes. 68 Against this history of 
the use of administrative detention in the democratic world, and 
name of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act. 44 HALSBURY's STATUTES 
OF ENGLAND 164 (3d ed. 1974). Parliament enacted this far-reaching legislation in response 
to a series of bombings in England by the Provisional Irish Republican Army. See C. 
WALKER, THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN BRITISH LAW 22-23 (1986). This legislation, inter 
alia, banned the Provisional Irish Republican Army, forbade solicitation on its behalf and 
permitted the expulsion (or exclusion) from England of any person suspected of acting on 
its behalf. Enforcement of the act (and its renewals) resulted in the expulsion of 140 persons 
from Britain to Northern Ireland, 29 persons from Britain to the Irish Republic during the 
period from February 1974 until June 1979. See Moxon-Browne, Water and the Fish: Pub-
lic Opinion and the Provisional l.R.A., in BRITISH PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM 41, 56 (P. 
Wilkinson ed. 1981). 
In addition, during this period 4,146 persons were detained for questioning regarding 
terrorism of whom only about ten percent of them were ever charged. Id. Current English 
anti-terrorism legislation is embodied in the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provi-
sions) Act 1984 (Continuance) Order 1987. 
65. Northern Ireland's anti-terrorism legislation provides for imprisonment without 
trial (Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1973, as amended, 43 HALSBURY's 
STATUTES OF ENGLAND 1235 (3d ed. 1973), makes illegal certain organizations connected with 
terrorism prohibits fundraising for proscribed organizations and prohibits recruiting to cer-
tain organizations and carrying out tasks for such organizations Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act of 1974, as amended, 44 HALSBURY's STATUTES OF ENGLAND 164 
(3d ed. 1974); The Northern Ireland (Emegency Provisions) Act of 1978, 48 HALSBURY's 
STATUTES OF ENGLAND 972 (3d ed. 1978). Cf. Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) 
Order 1972, S.I. 1972 No. 1632 (N.I.). 
66. A 1974 Amendment to the Article 272 of the Italian Criminal Procedure Code pro-
vides for preventive custody for durations up to two years. Provvedimenti urgenti sulla gius-
tizia penale, Gazetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana [Gaz. Uff.] 12 aprile 1974, n. 97; 
Legislazione Italiana (Giuffre) I [Leg. Ital. I] § 219, at 594 (1974). 
67. In 1970, the War Measures Act was proclaimed by the Federal Government of Can-
ada to cope with the armed attacks by the Quebec Liberation Front. Pursuant to this au-
thority, the government promulgated the Public Order Regulations. Under these regulations 
the Quebec Liberation Front was deemed illegal organization and 497 people were detained. 
See P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CANADA 388 (2d ed. 1985); see also Friedland, Adher-
inq to the Rules of Criminal Procedure in Cases of Terrorism, in THE JERUSALEM CONFER-
ENCE ON PEACE v. VIOLENCE 152, 155 (J. Davidson ed. 1979). 
68. In the United States, Congress has recently enacted the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 
which allows a judge to consider the dangerousness of the accused when determining 
whether to grant bail. Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1985 (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1356 (Supp. 1985)). Thus, peacetime preventative detention of uncer-
tain duration is now available throughout the United States. Note, As Time Goes By: Pre-
trial Incarceration Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 and the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 8 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1055 (1987); see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
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taking into consideration Israel's difficult security situation, and 
the availability of judicial review, the limited and careful use of 
administrative detention is reasonable and in compliance with lo-
cal and international law. 
VI. ISRAELI PROTECTIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
Israel has chosen to compromise security precautions in order 
to safeguard human rights. In this section I will examine some69 of 
the facts that substantiate this statement. 
A. THE ISRAELI HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE 
All Israeli citizens have the right to petition the Supreme 
Court of Israel sitting as the High Court of Justice70 for redress of 
any claim against the government, its agencies or employees. The 
Court's jurisdiction is laid down in section 15 of the Judicature 
law, which provides, inter alia: 
The Supreme Court shall sit also as a High Court of Justice. When 
so sitting, it shall hear matters in which it deems it necessary .to 
grant relief for the sake of justice and which are not within the 
jurisdiction of another court. 71 
The particular function of the High Court of Justice is to protect 
the preeminence of the rule of law in Israel by judicial review of 
the actions of public authorities. The High Court is especially ef-
fective in protecting the public from the abuse of power by individ-
uals acting under color of official authority. 
Upon the payment of a nominal fee,72 any person who consid-
ers that he has been prejudiced by an act over which the High 
Court of Justice has authority may petition the Court for an order 
nisi. 73 A single judge of the Court will hear the petition, usually ex 
parte, within a day or two of when the petition is filed. If the peti-
tioner presents a prima f acie case, the judge will grant an order 
69. For an examination of other Israeli protections for human rights (e.g., legislative 
oversight, the internal regulations of the governmental agencies such as the Israel Defence 
Forces, and the open and democratic nature of Israeli society), see E. COHEN, supra note 43, 
at 76-80. 
70. In addition to its role as a court of equity, when it sits as the High Court of Justice, 
the Supreme court also functions as an appellate court in civil and criminal matters. Review 
of decisions of the District Courts is thus had in the Supreme Court. 
71. Basic Law: Judicature, Laws of the State of Israel, sec. 15(b) (1984). 
72. The filing fee is approximately five dollars. E. COHEN, supra note 43, at 85. 
73. RULE OF LAW IN ADMINISTERED AREAS, supra note 51, at 36. An order nisi is a tem-
porary injunction. 
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nisi requiring the governmental authority named as respondent to 
appear in Court and defend its position. 1• The normal period 
granted to the respondent to file its reply is thirty days. 71 
Following the respondent's reply, a full hearing will be held 
before the Court sitting in bank. 76 After hearing both sides and 
reviewing the written submissions, the High' Court of Justice will 
either annul the order or make it final. 77 
Among the remedies available to the Court are a writ of 
habeas corpus,78 a writ of mandamus,79 an order of certiorari and 
prohibition,80 an order of quo warranto,81 and a declaratory 
order.82 
Beginning in 1967, residents of the Administered Areas who 
were not citizens of Israel were granted access to Israeli courts in 
order to bring claims against the government and its agencies in-
cluding the Israel Defence Forces.88 The High Court of Justice con-
siders petitions by residents of the Areas in an identical manner as 
it deals with petitions filed by citizens of Israel. Allowing residents 
of the Administered Areas access to Israeli courts, and in Oarticular 
to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice, is un-
precedented in the history of international law.8" 
In practice, the residents of the Administered Areas have in-
creasingly taken advantage of the willingness of the High Court of 
Justice to hear their petitions.81 
In recent years approximately twenty percent86 of all petitions 





78. Id. at 36-37. A writ of habeas corpus orders the release of a person illegally 
detained. 
79. Id. A writ of mandamus orders a governmental authority to carry out its duty. 
80. Id. An order of certiorari and prohibition prohibits a lower court from exceeding its 
jurisdiction or invalidating a judgment of a lower court. 
81. Id. An order of quo warranto forbids a person from exercising the powers of an 
office to which he has not been lawfully appointed. 
82. Id. A declaratory order declares a certain act to be unlawful. 
83. Access to Israeli courts for those residents of the Administered Areas who are not 
citizens of Israel was made possible by the government's decision not to raise a jurisdictional 
challenge in such cases. See Shamgar, supra note 52, at 262, 273. 
84. E. COHEN, supra note 43, at 80. 
85. Id. at 86. 
86. Interview with Uzi Hasson, Deputy State's Attorney, Israel Ministry of Justice 
(June, 1987) (statement that the percentage of filings from residents of the administered 
areas had risen to twenty percent of the total). 
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eas. The Court has delivered a number of widely publicized deci-
sions against the Israeli governmental agency named as 
respondent. 87 
The authority and accessibility of the Court, its commitment 
to one standard of justice for all who appear before it, and the 
speed with which it resolves controversies have made the Court a 
useful tool for aggrieved individuals on both sides of the green 
line.88 Merely the threat of a petition to the High Court of Justice 
can cause the government to reconsider its position and, if the 
facts merit, decide for or arrive at a compromise with the claim-
ant. 89 A governmental body that oversteps its bounds and infringes 
the human rights of any individual is liable to be quickly repri-
manded by the Supreme Court. 
Perhaps more than any other single feature, the unprece-
dented expansive jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice pre-
serves human rights for all residents of Israel and the Adminis-
tered Areas. 
87. See, e.g., Dweikat v. Government of Israel, HCJ 390/79, 34(i) P.D. 1 (1980). In 
Dweikat, the Supreme Court annulled a land requisition order issued by the Israeli Defence 
Forces for a parcel of privately owned Arab land. The order stipulated that the land was 
needed for an Israeli settlement. The Court found that political rather than security consid-
erations where the primary motivation for the requisition and ruled that the seizure order 
was invalid. The judgment ordered the removal of the Israeli settlers and returned posses-
sion of the land to its Arab owners. 
See also Jerusalem District Electricity Ltd. v. Minister of Energy and Infrastructure 
and the Regional Commander of Judea and Samaria, HCJ 351/80, 35(ii) P.D. 673 (1981). In 
Jerusalem District Electricity, the Israel Electric Company issued notice to the Arab-owned 
East Jerusalem Electric Company of the former's intention to acquire the latter's conces-
sion. The notice of acquisition was based on the terms of the concession itself, which enables 
the government to acquire it. This concession provides service to some residents of Israel as 
well as residents of the Administered Areas. The target of the acquisition petitioned the 
Supreme Court to remain independent. The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. See gen-
erally Drori, An Analysis of the Supreme Court Decision on Bet El and Eilon Moreh in 
Law and Legislation in Israel: A Periodic Summary and Analysis (1981) (study prepared for 
the Commission of International Affairs of the American Jewish Congress, New York, mime-
ographed); Dinstein, Elion Moreh: The Question of Legality, Ha'artez, June 12, 1979, at 2, 
col. 3. 
88. See E. COHEN, supra note 43, at 86-92. The "green line" refers to the 1949 Armi-
stice boundaries of Israel. These boundaries, which were never intended as permanent inter-
national frontiers, remained as Israel's de facto borders until the 1967 Six-Day War. They 
owe their name to the fact that they were indicated on a map with in green ink. The green 
line marked the front line between Israel and the various Arab states at the cease fire that 
ended the fighting in 1949. 
89. This fact was made clear in numerous interviews the author had with lawyers em-
ployed in the office of the Israel State Attorney's Office during the period 1981 until 1986 
17
Weiner: Terrorism: Israel's legal responses
Published by SURFACE, 1987
200 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 14:183 
B. IsRAEL 's AGREEMENT WITH THE RED CRoss 
Israel has an agreement with the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) whereby delegates of that organization are 
permitted to meet with security detainees in absolute privacy, even 
with those detainees still undergoing interrogation. 90 This agree-
ment, unprecedented when made in 1977, allows the first delegate 
to visit each detainee no later than fourteen days after his arrest. 91 
This visit may have the incidental side effect of diminishing 
the value of the arrested person's statements. Other members of a 
terror cell, aware that one of their number is in custody and might 
reveal their strategy, identities or the location their stored weap-
ons, can alter their plans, escape to Jordan and move their arms 
cache. Under the agreement, subsequent visits to the detained in-
dividual may be made as frequently as every two weeks (at the 
discretion of the ICRC) as long as he remains in custody.92 
As a consequence of this agreement, the ICRC delegates visit 
the jails and prisons in Israel and the Administered Areas on a 
regular basis. They are thus able to raise any issues regarding the 
conditions of jails, the behavior of the interrogators and guards, or 
the health of individual detainees with Israeli governmental au-
thorities.93 Perhaps most significantly, their regular presence acts 
90. The author has read, but for reasons of confidentiality cannot reveal, the letter 
agreement between the Minister of Defence of Israel and the President of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross. 
91. At a press conference given by the President of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross on February 1, 1978, the President stated that: 
Apres plus de dix ans de presence dans les territories occupes par Israel nous avons 
pu, a la fin 1977, conclure un nouvel accord avel les autorites israeliennes. Nous 
avons, en effet, eprouve le besoin, apres ces dix annees, de revoir !'ensemble de la 
situation et d'etablir de nouveaux contacts avec le Gouvernement, qui a change en-
tretemps. Nous avons obtenu, suite aces negociations, de pouvoir visiter les person-
nes residant dans les territoires occupes arabes incarcerees pour une raison ou autre 
a partir du 14eme jour suivant leur arrestation, une semaine meme dans certains 
cas, ce qui est un grand progres par rapport a las situation precedente. En effet, ces 
personnes se trouvent alors sous interrogatiore, et il est exceptionnel que les 
delegues du C.l.C.R. puissent avoir acces aux detenus durant cette periode .... 
Nous sommes cependant tres satisfaits de ces noubelles possibilities d'action dans 
les tel'.ritoires occupes par Israel. 
Press Conference given by the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(Feb. 1, 1978), reprinted in ISRAEL NAT'L SEC. OF THE INT'L CoMM'N OF JURISTS, THE RULE OF 
LAW IN THE AREAS ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL, 105-06 n.47 (1981) (translation available in 
Syracuse J . Int'l L. & Com. Office). 
92. Such visits may be made regardless of what stage of custody an individual is in, i.e., 
during interrogation, after having been charged, during trial, or following conviction. 
93. The confidentiality of the relationship between the Government of Israel and the 
ICRC precludes the furnishing of details on particular cases. 
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as a continual safeguard against any systematic inhumane treat-
ment of those in custody. 
C. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCHDOGS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT 
The Government of Israel has internalized its concern for 
human rights. Governmental responsiveness to human rights in-
quiries and criticisms is one measure of concern for human rights. 
Several offices monitor human rights compliance from within the 
government.•• These bodies are regularly involved in sensitive 
human rights cases and policies, in some instances even before 
they reach the attention of the public. 
One such office is the Human Rights Division of the Justice 
. Ministry, which is a division of the Attorney General's Office. This 
office, created more than ten years ago, investigates and responds 
substantively to thousands of inquiries from abroad. The majority 
of these inquiries are received from Amnesty International,91 rep-
resentatives of the news media, lawyers' groups, academics, and 
private individuals. Many of these queries are critical of Israel's 
action as regards a particular case or policy. As a general practice, 
each letter of inquiry receives an individual response. 96 Israel's re-
sponsiveness has been appreciated. For example, Amnesty Interna-
tional member Sir Jack Kent Hunn of New Zealand wrote in 
response: 
Thank you for your letter of 6 March, 1984 .... It is only the 
second acknowledgment I have received in nearly four years from 
any country. (The other one was also from yourself, on 3 January, 
1983 - File No. 164 133 re Bashir Barghouti). I very much appreci-
ate the courtesy of a reply in such detail. 97 
The author's personal experience on the legal staff of the Jus-
tice Ministry's Human Rights Division allows him to state that 
this office is proficient at investigating human rights allegations, 
substantive or merely contentious, which are leveled at Israel.98 In 
94. The most prominent of these offices are the Human Rights Division of the Justice 
Ministry and the Human Rights Desk of the Foreign Ministry. 
95. Amnesty International is an international human rights organization based in 
London. The inquiries made by Amnesty International are from either the International 
Secretariat or particular members. 
96. See Letter of Itzhak Zamir (Attorney General, State of Israel) to Thomas Hammer-
berg (Secretary General, Amnesty International) 5-6 (Mar. 10, 1986) (discussing the Am-
nesty International Report of 1985). 
97. Id. at 6. 
98. Among the methods used by this office are the review of court files, contacting the 
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the event that an allegation is meritorious, the Attorney General, 
by virtue of the independence of his office from the political arena, 
an independence guaranteed by law, is able and will intervene with 
the relevant authorities to see that human rights are defended. 
In addition to the Human Rights Division in the Justice Min-
istry there exists in the Foreign Ministry an office which also deals 
with these matters. These two offices work in conjunction with the 
legal advisors of the Israel Defence Forces, the General Security 
Service, the Prisons Service, the Police and other official bodies to 
exercise continual overview of governmental policies and how they 
affect individual rights.99 
D. EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR A CONVICTION 
In some modern jurisdictions, such as England,100 New Zea-
responsible authorities in the Israel Police, Israel Defence Forces and Prison's Service and 
discussing the matter with the attorneys involved. 
99. The author of this article served on the legal staff of the Human Rights Division of 
the Israeli Ministry of Justice from 1981 until 1987. During this period the cooperation 
extended to the Justice Ministry by the other branches of the government named in the 
body of this article was generally good or excellent. 
The one exception was for a period during 1986 when the relationship between the 
Justice Ministry and the General Security Service was under great stress as a result of what 
was known as the General Security Service Affair. This affair arose from the killing of two 
PLO terrorists who were captured after they had hijacked a bus and held its civilian passen-
gers and driver hostage. 
During the hijacking the terrorists attempted to negotiate for the release of hundreds of 
convicted PLO terrorists from prison. As the bus was retaken by Israel Defence Forces 
troops one passenger was killed and a number of others wounded. The two terrorists in 
question were captured alive but subsequently killed by General Security Service personnel. 
The campaign to see justice done by then Attorney General Itzhak Zamir resulted in a 
temporary rupture of relations between the Justice Ministry and the General Security Ser-
vice. The governmental crisis that resulted from this affair resulted in the removal from 
office of the of the head of the General Security Service and a number of his subordinates. 
An additional controversy has arisen very recently as a result of the publication of the 
report of the Landau Commission of Inquiry. This Commission was appointed by the gov-
ernment to investigate the General Security Service. It was headed by retired Supreme 
Court Justice Moshe Landau. Although the author has not yet obtained a copy of the re-
port, initial news coverage of the findings are very disturbing. They indicate that the Gen-
eral Security Service has for years used physical pressure on suspected · terrorists and that it 
covered-up this practice to avoid having its evidence thrown out of court. Friedman, Israelis 
Seem Ambivilant on Violence in Domestic War, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1987, sec. 4, at 2, col. 
4. 
In the opinion of this author, the government sponsorship of the Landau Commission is 
indicative of the self-cleansing nature of Israeli democracy; something unique in the Middle 
East. Moreover, it demonstrates that while shaken, human rights and the rule of law remain 
central and authentic values that Israel strives to fulfill. 
100. The English rule is that a person may be convicted of any offense, with the possi-
ble exception of capital offenses, upon his own extrajudicial confession without any corrobo-
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land,1°1 Australia,102 and American jurisdictions such as Wiscon-
sin, 103 a suspect's confession can form the sole evidentiary basis for 
a conviction, provided that such confession was voluntary. By con-
trast, the rules of evidence in Israel 104 and the Administered Ar-
eas105 are more favorable to accused individuals in that they re-
quire some independent additional evidence in order to find the 
accused guilty. This evidence may consist of proof that no one but 
the accused could have possibly committed the offense, proof that 
the accused controlled the weapon used in the offense, or proof 
that the accused had knowledge that could have been possessed 
only by the person who committed the offense.106 
This rule of evidence has the result of further reducing the 
temptation of the investigator or prosecutor to threaten or mal-
treat the accused in order to obtain a confession. If the accused 
retracts his confession on the grounds that it was involuntary, a 
"little trial"107 is held. The burden of proof in the little trial lies 
with the prosecution which must demonstrate that the confession 
was not obtained under duress. Should the prosecution fail to dis-
charge this burden, the court will rule the confession 
inadmissible. 108 
This rule of evidence regarding confessions makes prosecution 
of terrorist acts significantly more difficult. This is because not in-
frequently a suspect who has made a confession will be tempted to 
complicate the prosecution's case by later alleging that his state-
ment was involuntary. In addition, the little trial procedure confers 
a tactical advantage on the defense because it interrupts the trial 
and places a significant additional burden on the state.109 Despite 
these costs, this rule of evidence has credibility as a safeguard 
against the abuse of suspects and the conviction of the innocent. 
rative evidence. See 8 HALSBURY's STATUTES OF ENGLAND 588 (3d ed. 1969). 
101. R v. Murray, [1951) 1 K.B. 391-92; [1950) 2 All E.R. 925, 927. 
102. Wright v. R, 15 Austl. L.R. 305, 310-11 (1977). 
103. Potman v. State, 259 Wis 234, 47 N.W.2d 884 (1951). 
104. See, e.g., Dahan v. State of Israel, Cr. App. 515/73, 33(iii) P.D. 432 (1979). 
105. The rules of evidence applicable in Israeli courts martial are applied in the mili-
tary courts in the administered areas 
106. See, e.g., Cr. App. 515/73, Dahan v. State of Israel, 28(i) P.D. 460 (1974). 
107. The little trial procedure is known as the "mishpat zuta." 
108. Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version), 36 Laws of the State of Israel 35, 
sec. 153, at 63 (1982); see, e.g., Andalarski v. Attorney General, Cr. App. 3/49, 2 P.D. 589 
(1949). ' 
109. The author was apprised of such examples of the misuse of the "little trial" proce-
dure by lawyers in the Military Prosecutor's Office. 
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E. THE DEATH PENALTY 
The death penalty is currently available in thirty-seven Amer-
ican states, 110 despite questions regarding its constitutionality111 
and the fairness with which it is applied. 112 Israel, with a security 
situation much more challenging than that of any American state, 
has never used the death penalty against a terrorist, although 
thousands of terrorists (among them hundreds of murderers) have 
been tried and convicted. 
Imprisoning terrorist murderers poses a special risk to Israeli 
society. The PLO terrorist who is imprisoned for murder, unlike 
individuals imprisoned for "ordinary" killings, immediately be-
comes the catalyst for further terrorist acts aimed at securing his 
release. Such acts typically involve the menacing of civilian hos-
tages, 113 which is clearly contrary to international law.114 
110. AMNESTY INT1L, USA: THE DEATH PENALTY 192 (1987). 
111. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972). 
112. Id. 
113. Chalfont, Our Main Problem: The Climate of Appeasement, in INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORISM: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE supra note 16, at 79, 86 (1981). One possible means of 
discouraging the taking of hostages to force the authorities to release convicted terrorist 
murderers would be to utilize a conditional death sentence. That is, the individual would be 
sentenced to death but this penalty would be commuted unless and until hostages were 
taken by others in his organization demanding his release. Thereupon the death penalty 
would be effectuated. To the best of the author's knowledge no government has imple-
mented such a statute. 
114. There can be no question that taking of civilian hostages is forbidden in both in-
ternational conflicts and non-international conflicts. See Geneva Convention for the Amelio-
ration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armend Forces in the Field, art. 3, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.l.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Ame-
lioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.l.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, T.l.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, arts. 3, 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.l.A.S. No. 
3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. The PLO's standard operating procedure has featured the taking of 
hostages. 
For example, on May 13, 1974, approximately 90 teenagers on a school outing in the 
Northern Israeli town of Ma'alot were taken hostage in a school. The choice of children as 
hostages was deliberate. Their captors, who were members of the Popular Democratic Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine, a faction of the PLO, demanded the release of 26 prisoners 
in Israeli jails. Twenty of the children were killed (along with several other Israeli civilians) , 
and some 70 were wounded by the terrorists when Israeli troops re-took the school. See D. 
HIRST, THE GUN AND THE OLIVE BRANCH: THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 329-
30 (1977). 
115. Specified acts of treason in times of armed hostilities are punishable by either life 
imprisonment or the death penalty. Perpetrators of acts intended to impair the sovereignty 
of the State, acts intended to bring about military action against the State, and acts in-
tended to assist an enemy in war against Israel all risk capital punishment. Penal Law, 
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The death penalty has been abolished in Israel for all but a 
few crimes. m During the nearly forty years the state has been in 
existence, a death sentence has been carried out only once - in the 
case of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann.116 
In the Administered Areas, although the death penalty had 
been authorized by local Jordanian lawm as well as the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, 118 Israel has administratively prevented the 
imposition of the death penalty.119 
Government policy through the successive Labor, Likud and 
National Unity governments, has been never to instruct the mili- . 
tary prosecutor to request the death penalty.120 This policy has 
been maintained, despite periodic public protests, even for ter-
rorists convicted of especially cruel acts of murder .121 After an up-
surge in terrorism, the Knesset (Israel's legislature) in 1985 recon-
sidered Israel's policy on using the death penalty. This review, 
which took place at a time of public outrage over the murders of a 
number of young Israelis, did not result in any change in policy.121 
The price of Israel's terrorist policy has continued to be felt by 
innocent victims. In November 1986, a yeshiva student named 
Eliahu Amedi was fatally stabbed as he walked through the old 
city of Jerusalem. His three assailants were caught near the scene 
of the crime. They were convicted after having confessed. Sen-
tenced to life imprisonment, they announced in court that they 
Special Volume, Laws of the State of Israel, secs. 96-99, at 34-35 (1977). 
The death penalty may be imposed by the court under the following provisions: Nazis 
and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 4 Laws of the State of Israel, sec. 2(f), at 154 
(1950); Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945, art. 111 (1945), as incorporated into Is-
raeli law by the Law and Administration Ordinance, 1 Laws of the State of Israel, sec. 11, at 
7 (1948). 
115. The Eichmann case was decided more than 25 years ago. Eichmann v. Attorney 
General, Cr. App. 336/61, 16(iii) P.D. 2033 (1961). See generally E. COHEN, supra note 43, at 
141. 
116. Local law in force when Israel entered the Administered Areas provided for the 
death penalty for the unauthorized carrying of firearms, for discharging of firearms at a 
person/s, sabotage and membership in a group where any one or more of its members com-
mitted an offence punishable by death. Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945, art. 58, in 
PALESTINE GAZETTE No. 1442, at 1058 (Supp. No. 2, 1945). Local .civil law also provided for 
the mandatory death penalty in certain circumstances. See E. COHEN, supra note 43, at 140. 
117. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 44, art. 68, para. 2 (1949) . 
. 118. Local Courts Death Penalty Order, No. 268-1968, in PROCLAMATIONS, ORDERS AND 
APPOINTMENTS (JUDEA AND SAMARIA) No. 14, at 537; see also E. COHEN, supra note 43, at 140. 
119. E. COHEN, supra note 43, at 141. 
120. See id. 
121. Letter from Y ona Blatman (Acting Attorney General, State of Israel) to Ian Mar-
tin (Secretary General, Amnesty International) 3 (July 22, 1987). 
122. Amedi Murders Get Life, Jerusalem Post, Dec. 24, 1986, at 1. 
23
Weiner: Terrorism: Israel's legal responses
Published by SURFACE, 1987
206 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 14:183 
were members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(an extreme faction of the PLO), that "any Jew" would have suf-
ficed as a target, and that "We have no regrets. We'll be released 
anyway in the next prisoner exchange. "118 
VII. A BALANCING TEST: HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
SECURITY 
The security risks facing Israel today are substantially dissimi-
lar to those in the United States and other Western democracies. 
This must be taken into account when striking the balance be-
tween two worthy goals: human rights and security. 
What would happen if human rights were expanded at the ex-
pense of security? In a Middle Eastern context this would engen-
der anarchy. Residents of Jerusalem would live in fear as do the 
residents of Beirut. Terrorists of various persuasions and affilia-
tions, including some Jews,1H would exploit the opportunity to vic-
timize innocent civili'ans. On the other extreme, Israel could 
tighten security, but at the risk of becoming a police state. 
Obviously the side effects accompanying both extremes are 
undesirable. Israel has therefore chosen to balance these two val-
ues, security and human rights; despite the obvious drawbacks of 
this compromise. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
Recent events indicate that the laws against terrorism have 
failed to protect Israeli society. Moreover, the efforts of some to 
exculpate terrorist acts against Israeli targets have enjoyed some 
success at the United Nations.121 Israel therefore faces a grave situ-
ation where it is censured for using its legal tools to combat terror-
123. The early 1980's saw the emergence of a new terrorism in Israel and the Adminis-
tered Areas - Jewish terrorism. A number of attacks on Arabs were made on civilians. Sub-
sequently, the 28 members of so-called "Jewish Underground" and a smaller number of 
others were apprehended and convicted. While the immediate danger of Jewish terrorism 
appears to have passed, in the author's opinion there continue to exist individuals who, if 
provoked (i.e., by PLO attacks on Jewish targets) would strike at innocent Arabs. 
124. See, e.g., Soafer, Terrorism and the Law, FOREIGN Arr. 901 (1986); see also Kirk-
patrick, The Totalitarian Confusion, in TERRORISM: How THE WEST CAN WIN, supra note 2, 
at 56, 58. For an examination of the United Nation's obsession with Israel, see Bialkin, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 10, 1985, § 1, at 27. An authoritative legal analysis of General Assembly resolu-
tions critical of Israel appears in J . STONE, ISRAEL AND PALESTINE 27-44 (1981). 
125. See, e.g., Van Aggelen, Protection of Human Riqhts in the Israeli Held Territo-
ries Since 1967 in the Light of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 32 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 83, 90-101 (1976). 
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ism. This criticism is typically couched in human rights 
terminology. 
Regrettably, legal measures cannot alone solve the problem of 
terrorism. However, much more can be achieved, especially if in-
ternational cooperation increases. Among the proposals worth con-
sidering are the examination of diplomatic pouches for 
weapons, paying rewards to informants, and most importantly, pe-
nalizing countries that sponsor or harbor terrorists. Nations should 
energetically pursue international cooperation with the goal of 
eliminating all manifestations of terrorism. At every step along the 
way we must, as the State of Israel does, consider not only its citi-
zen's security, but all people's human rights. 
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